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ABSTRACT
Today, solutions for cross-blockchain asset transfers are either tai-
lored for specific assets, require certain means of cross-blockchain
communication, or neglect finality guarantees that prevent assets
from getting lost in transit.
In this paper, we present a cross-blockchain asset transfer proto-
col that supports arbitrary assets, is adaptable to different means
of cross-blockchain communication, and adheres to requirements
such as finality. The ability to freely transfer assets between block-
chains may increase transaction throughput and provide developers
with more flexibility by allowing them to design digital assets that
leverage the capacities and capabilities of multiple blockchains.
KEYWORDS
Cross-blockchain asset transfers, cross-blockchain communication,
blockchain interoperability
1 INTRODUCTION
With its ability to store data and perform computations in a de-
centralized and immutable manner, blockchain technology shows
potential in a wide range of application areas such as finance [26],
business process management [31], supply chain management [34],
or healthcare [25].
To address the diverse requirements of these areas, a variety of in-
dependent and unconnected blockchains has been developed [32].
As it is unlikely that a single blockchain emerges that caters to
the needs of all these different areas [38], there is a strong need
for interoperability. Especially in scenarios where assets—digital
representations of value—are managed on-chain, the lack of in-
teroperability leads to a vendor lock-in as assets cannot leave the
blockchain platform on which they were issued.
This vendor lock-in exposes projects to significant risks such as
limited scalability [8], the risk that the underlying blockchain sinks
into insignificance [6], and the inability to take advantage of new
features offered by novel blockchains [32].
Of course, a centralized entity can be deployed to migrate assets
from one blockchain to another. However, if asset holders have
to rely completely on that entity, this contradicts the demand for
decentralization being the reason for the adoption of blockchain
technology in the first place.
By enabling decentralized cross-blockchain asset transfers, these
problems can be averted without having to trust a centralized en-
tity [32]. The ability to transfer assets to arbitrary blockchains at
will would remove the need to commit to a particular blockchain
at launch. Rather, assets could be migrated to new blockchains
offering novel functionality or better security at any time [32]. An-
other potential use case of cross-blockchain asset transfers arises
in the context of sidechains [4, 30]. The idea is that an asset can
be transferred to and subsequently processed on multiple “side”
blockchains, thus reducing the workload of the original blockchain.
One way to exchange assets between independent blockchains
is via atomic swaps [17]. However, atomic swaps do not constitute
true cross-blockchain asset transfers as no asset is transferred from
one blockchain to the other but rather ownership of different assets
changes in an atomic fashion without the different assets leaving
their respective blockchains. True cross-blockchain asset transfers,
on the contrary, achieve that an asset actually moves from one
blockchain to the other, enabling users to hold different denomina-
tions of the same asset type on multiple blockchains, and to shift
these denominations freely between the involved blockchains.
While schemes for true cross-blockchain asset transfers have
been proposed before, most of these solutions are designed with spe-
cific means of cross-blockchain communication in mind and thus
put strong interdependence constraints on the participating block-
chains. Further, most solutions neglect important requirements for
cross-blockchain asset transfers, such as finality guarantees, that
prevent assets from getting lost in transit.
Thus, in this paper, we first derive a set of general requirements
that need to be fulfilled by cross-blockchain asset transfers, and
then propose a protocol that (a) is compliant with the defined re-
quirements and (b) does not impose interdependence constraints on
the involved blockchains. The proposed protocol abstracts means
of cross-blockchain communication and can thus be adapted to fit
different blockchains and use cases.
The contributions of this paper can be summed up as follows.
• We formally define functional requirements for cross-block-
chain asset transfers.
• We define protocol specifications for enabling cross-block-
chain asset transfers that are decentralized, secure and not-
reliant on specific means of cross-blockchain communica-
tion.
• We evaluate the proposed protocols on public Ethereum
test networks using a proof-of-concept implementation for
EVM1-based blockchains.
To this end, Section 2 introduces notations and definitions that
are used in Section 3 to formally define the requirements and pro-
tocols for cross-blockchain asset transfers. Section 4 evaluates the
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proposed protocols with regard to cost, duration, security, and fea-
tures using a proof-of-concept implementation. Section 5 provides
an overview of related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
This section introduces some notations and definitions necessary
for describing the requirements and specification of the proposed
cross-blockchain asset transfer protocol.
As has been mentioned in Section 1, cross-blockchain asset trans-
fers ideally enable users to hold different denominations of the same
asset on multiple blockchains at the same time, i.e., users are free to
choose on which blockchain they want to hold their assets. An asset
can be seen as anything holding some value with a corresponding
representation on a blockchain.
Assets can generally be divided into fungible and non-fungible
assets [29]. Fungibility implies that two entities of the same as-
set can be used interchangeably. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin or
Ether are fungible assets. A further example for fungible assets are
Ethereum tokens following the ERC20 standard. On the other hand,
non-fungible assets are uniquely identifiable, i.e., one entity cannot
be simply substituted by another entity. For instance, Cryptokitties
are non-fungible assets.
One can further distinguish between native and user-defined
assets [29]. Native assets are inherently part of a particular block-
chain. One cannot exist without the other, e.g., the Bitcoin and
Ether cryptocurrencies and the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains,
respectively. However, certain blockchains provide the capability to
define almost arbitrary programs, so-called smart contracts. These
smart contracts are often used to implement use-case specific assets
with their own set of rules, e.g., ERC20 tokens [9]. Contrary to
native assets, user-defined assets are not bound to specific block-
chains, they could potentially be deployed on any blockchain with
the according scripting capabilities to express the asset’s rules.
This work concentrates on user-defined assets since the goal is to
provide an asset that allows users to hold different amounts of the
same asset on multiple blockchains at the same time. We formally
define an asset A as a set where the set’s members represent the
asset’s smallest indivisible entities (asset entities). For instance, the
smallest indivisible entity of a fungible asset like Bitcoin is a Satoshi
(i.e., 0.00000001 BTC). For a non-fungible asset like Cryptokitties,
the smallest indivisible entity is a single “cryptokitty”. Accordingly,
|A| represents the total supply of the asset.
We define the set of blockchains betweenwhich cross-blockchain
asset transfers can take place by the finite set B. Each blockchainb ∈
B can host multiple smart contracts. Out of these smart contracts,
one contract is responsible for managing asset A on b. We denote
this particular smart contract as cb for each b ∈ B.
We assume blockchains to roughly follow the model devised by
Satoshi Nakatomo [26]. The state of the blockchain is updated by
means of transactions. Transactions are cryptographically-signed
instructions that are created outside the blockchain and bundled
into new blocks. New blocks are broadcast to nodes in a peer-to-
peer network. Participating nodes validate each new block along
with its transactions and append the block to their local copy of the
blockchain only if they accept it as valid. If a new block is accepted
as valid by the majority of participants, the block defines the new
state of the blockchain.
Transactions can be used to transfer the native asset of the block-
chain, to store arbitrary data, or to trigger the execution of smart
contracts. In the latter case, the transaction’s payload contains pa-
rameters based on which the smart contracts may change their
associated state. For instance, a transaction payload containing a
sender, a recipient and an amount could trigger a smart contract
causing the transfer of some user-defined asset from the sender to
the recipient.
We specify transactions as a tuple containing the elements of
the payload which serve as parameters for the invoked contract. In
particular, we use tx B ⟨param1, . . . ,paramn⟩ to denote a transac-
tion tx with a payload containing n parameters. Further, we define
the function calledContract(tx) to return the address of the smart
contract that was triggered by transaction tx. The execution of
transactions may fail, for instance, if a user does not have enough
funds for a transfer or some condition is violated. For this, we de-
fine function isSuccessful(tx) to return true or false depending on
whether the transaction was executed successfully or not.
Every transaction is signed by some off-chain user u ∈ U before
submitted to the blockchain. submitter(tx) denotes the user that
signed tx. Users can be the owners of a subset of asset A on each
participating blockchain b ∈ B. Subsequently, the set Abu ⊆ A
defines the entities of asset A that are owned by a particular user
u ∈ U on blockchain b.
Finally, for two blockchains src, dest ∈ B and two users sender,
recipient ∈ U , we define a cross-blockchain asset transfer as transfer
of some X ⊆ A from user sender on source blockchain src to user
recipient on destination blockchain dest.
3 CROSS-BLOCKCHAIN ASSET TRANSFERS
In this section, we first define requirements for cross-blockchain
asset transfers and then use these requirements as the foundation
to define a decentralized cross-blockchain asset transfer protocol.
Fundamental to the protocol is the ability to communicate state in-
formation between blockchains. In particular, the protocol relies on
the ability to verify the inclusion of transactions across blockchains.
However, the protocol treats transaction inclusion verifications as a
blackbox, i.e., the protocol does not pose any restrictions on the con-
crete mechanism that is used for cross-blockchain communication.
Different solutions for cross-blockchain communication and how
these can be used to perform transaction inclusion verifications are
explained in Section 3.3.
3.1 Requirements
As defined in Section 2, a cross-blockchain asset transfer for an
asset A constitutes the transfer of ownership of some subset X ⊆ A
from some user sender on a source blockchain src to another user
recipient on a destination blockchain dest.
Before the transfer, X must only exist on blockchain src, and
after the transfer, the asset must only exist on blockchain dest.
At no point should X exist on both blockchains in parallel, since
the accidental duplication of asset entities can potentially lead to
a deflation of the asset’s value. Hence, a cross-blockchain asset
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transfer should only be successful, i.e., X is created on dest, if X has
been priorly burned (i.e., destroyed) on src.
Therefore, before X can be recreated on dest, dest needs some
kind of evidence that X has already been burned on src. If we
assume that it is possible to provide such evidence guaranteeing
that X has been burned on src and that this evidence can be used to
recreate X on dest, two further requirements emerge. First, faking
the evidence needs to be prevented at all cost. Users should not be
able to counterfeit evidence certifying that X has been burned on
src without it actually having occurred. Second, if the evidence is
correct (i.e., it has not been faked), it should only be usable once to
recreate X on a different blockchain, i.e., on blockchain dest. Hence,
evidence of X having been burned on src cannot be used multiple
times to recreate X on other blockchains. Essentially, disregard of
any of these requirements would enable users to illegally create
new entities of asset A out of nothing—again potentially deflating
the value of the asset and decreasing trust in this particular asset.
A further requirement comes up when trying to prevent the
opposite, an accidental inflation of the asset’s value. Accidental
inflation could take place if X is burned on src without ever being
recreated on dest reducing the total supply of A. Hence, cross-
blockchain asset transfers need to be eventually finalized as not to
decrease the total supply ofA over time. That is, either the transfer is
executed completely or it fails with no intermediate state persisting.
Finally, it could be the case that the source blockchain src needs
to perform some action if and only if a certain cross-blockchain
asset transfer has been executed successfully (i.e., X has been suc-
cessfully recreated on destination blockchain dest). For instance,
imagine a business deal where some user buyer wants to buy as-
set entities Y ⊆ A′, with A′ ∩ A = ∅, from another user seller.
While asset A′ lives exclusively on the source blockchain src, user
buyer aims to buy Y with cross-blockchain asset A, transferring
X from themselves on blockchain src to user seller on blockchain
dest. Therefore, ownership of Y can change on src if and only if it
is ensured that the transfer of X was successful, i.e., blockchain src
must retrieve a confirmation of the successful transfer.
To sum up, we define the general requirements for a cross-
blockchain asset transfer as follows.
Requirement 1: Ownership.
When a user sender wants to burn X on blockchain src, X should
only be burned if X ⊆ Asrcsender.
Requirement 2: No Claim Without Burn.
When transferring some X ⊆ A from the source blockchain src to
the destination blockchain dest, X should only be recreated on dest,
if it can be proven that X has already been burned on src. That is, it
should not be possible to counterfeit the burning of asset entities.
Requirement 3: Double Spend Prevention.
Double spending must be prevented at all times. That is, if X is
burned on one blockchain, X can only be recreated once on one
other blockchain.
Requirement 4: Decentralized Finality.
If X is burned on one blockchain, X is always recreated on another
blockchain within a certain time limit t . Further, finality should not
be dependent on a single actor (centralized), rather any participant
should be able to finalize transfers (decentralized).
1. Burn
2. Claim
User
Destination
Blockchain
Source
Blockchain
Figure 1: Base protocol for cross-blockchain asset transfers
1. Burn
2. Claim
User
Source
Blockchain 3. Confirm
Destination
Blockchain 
Figure 2: Protocol extension to provide transfer confirma-
tions
Requirement 5: Transfer Confirmation (optional).
After burningX on source blockchain src, src will eventually receive
a confirmation that X has been successfully recreated on another
blockchain. Analogous to decentralized finality, any user should be
able to submit confirmations.
In the next section, we define a cross-blockchain asset transfer
protocol that fulfils these requirements. To this end, we first define
a base protocol that fulfils Requirements 1 to 4. We then provide an
extension of the protocol in order to also account for Requirement 5.
3.2 Protocol
As mentioned above, a cross-blockchain asset transfer should only
be successful if the asset is first burned on the source blockchain and
then recreated on the destination blockchain (Requirement 2). This
requires at least two steps, one “burn” step on the source blockchain,
and one “claim” step on the destination blockchain (see Figure 1).
With this in mind, we can outline a minimal protocol for cross-
blockchain asset transfers.
3.2.1 Base Protocol.
A minimal protocol for cross-blockchain asset transfers consists of
a burn transaction txburn submitted to source blockchain src and a
claim transaction txclaim submitted to destination blockchain dest.
The specification is outlined in Protocol 1.
As a first step, some user sender creates transaction txburn. The
payload of txburn contains the user intended as recipient of the
transfer (recipient), an identifier representing the desired destina-
tion blockchain (dest), and the asset entities to be transferred (X ).
User sender then signs and submits txburn to the source block-
chain src invoking smart contract csrc which manages asset A
on blockchain src (Step 1.a). The smart contract then performs
the following steps. First, it verifies that the specified destination
blockchain dest is actually part of the cross-blockchain ecosys-
tem (Step 1.(b)i). Second, the contract makes sure that user sender
is actually the current owner of X on blockchain src (Step 1.(b)ii).
If both checks are successful, X is burned on src (Step 1.(b)iii).
Once txburn is included in blockchain src and confirmed by
enough succeeding blocks, any user u ∈ U can construct the claim
transaction txclaim. The payload of txclaim consists of transaction
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Protocol 1 Base protocol for cross-blockchain asset transfers
Goal: For two blockchains src, dest ∈ B and two users sender, recipient ∈ U , transfer X ⊆ A from src to dest and change ownership of X from
sender to recipient.
1. Burn. User sender creates a new burn transaction txburn B ⟨recipient, dest,X ⟩.
(a) User sender signs and submits txburn to source blockchain src invoking contract csrc, i.e., the contract managing asset A on src .
(b) When being invoked, contract csrc performs the following operations.
(i) Verify dest ∈ B to make sure that the specified blockchain dest is part of the cross-blockchain ecosystem.
(ii) Verify X ⊆ Asrcsender to make sure that user sender owns the asset entities she wants to transfer on blockchain src.
(iii) When all checks are successful, the asset entities to be transferred are burned, i.e., Asrcsender = A
src
sender \ X .
2. Claim. Once txburn has been successfully executed on blockchain src, any user u ∈ U can construct the claim transaction
txclaim B ⟨txburn, prooftxburn ⟩. Variable prooftxburn contains data which can be used to prove the successful execution and inclusion of
txburn within blockchain src.
(a) User u signs and submits txclaim to some blockchain b ∈ B invoking contract cb, i.e., the contract managing asset A on b.
(b) When being invoked, contract cb performs the following steps.
(i) Verify b = dest to ensure that the executing blockchain b is the intended destination blockchain dest. Note that dest, recipient,
and X are available within cb as these variables are contained within the payload of txburn.
(ii) Verify txburn < Tburn where Tburn is the set of burn transactions that have already been used to claim entities of asset A on
dest. This ensures that burn transactions cannot be used multiple times for claiming.
(iii) Run verifyInclusion(txburn, prooftxburn , src) to verify that txburn has been included in blockchain src and is confirmed by
enough blocks. The details of transaction inclusion verifications are explained in Section 3.3.
(iv) Verify calledContract(txburn) = csrc to make sure that the contract that has been invoked by txburn is a contract authorized for
managing asset A on blockchain src.
(v) Verify that isSuccessful(txburn) returns true to ensure that the execution of csrc has been completed without any error.
(vi) If timeoutReached(txburn, prooftxburn , src) returns true, user recipient has not submitted txclaim in time. Hence, the user
u = submitter(txclaim) that submitted txclaim receives a transfer fee Xfee ⊆ X as reward for finalizing the transfer, i.e.,
Adestu = A
dest
u ∪ Xfee. Otherwise, no fee will be payed to u (i.e., Xfee = ∅) resulting in all asset entities being transferred to
recipient (see next step).
(vii) Assign ownership of the transferred asset entities to user recipient, i.e., Adestrecipient = A
dest
recipient ∪ (X \ Xfee).
(viii) Add txburn to the set of already used burn transactions, i.e., Tburn = Tburn ∪ {txburn}.
txburn and some proof data that can be used to verify the inclusion
of txburn in blockchain src (prooftxburn ). Note that if only the sender
or only the recipient of the transfer were allowed to submit txclaim,
the finality of the transfer (Requirement 4) would be entirely de-
pendent on that particular user, e.g., the user could simply decide
not to submit txclaim.
User u then signs and submits txclaim to some blockchain b ∈ B
invoking the contract cb managing A on blockchain b (Step 2.a).
The contract then performs the following steps. First, it veri-
fies that b is the intended destination blockchain dest (Step 2.(b)i).
Second, it is verified that txburn has not been used to claim X
on b before (Step 2.(b)ii). Third, if both checks are successful, the
transaction inclusion verification is carried out.
As mentioned above, the protocol treats transaction inclusion
verifications as a blackbox. More precisely, the protocol requires a
smart contract on the destination blockchain dest that simply pro-
vides an answer to the question whether a certain transaction has
been included in the source blockchain src by returning either true
or false. We elaborate on approaches that can be used to implement
such a contract in Section 3.3. The transaction inclusion verification
is carried out by passing txburn and proof data prooftxburn to the
smart contract capable of performing transaction inclusion verifica-
tions for blockchain src (Step 2.(b)iii). If this smart contract returns
true, it means that txburn is included and confirmed in src.
After verifying the inclusion of txburn in blockchain src, the
contract cb verifies that the contract that burned X on src is a valid
contract authorized for managing A on src (Step 2.(b)iv). If this is
the case, contract cb further checks that txburn was successful, i.e.,
the execution of contract csrc has been completed without any error,
e.g., constraint violations (Step 2.(b)v). This check covers the case
that in some blockchains transactions may be included even if the
triggered smart contract execution was not successful. While this is
the case for blockchains such as Ethereum, other blockchains may
not include such transactions at all.
The above checks guarantee that txclaim can only be executed
successfully with a corresponding successful txburn. However, an
additional mechanism is needed to account for Requirement 4,
transfer finality. In particular, it needs to be ensured that when
transaction txburn takes place on blockchain src, eventually also the
corresponding txclaim is submitted to destination blockchain dest.
Usually, the incentive for transfer finalization lies with the recip-
ient of the transfer since the recipient wants to receive the trans-
ferred asset entities. However, in case the recipient is indisposed
to submit txclaim for some reason, the protocol offers an incentive
in the form of a transfer fee to other users. That is, any user u that
successfully submits txclaim gets assigned a subset Xfee ⊆ X as
reward (Step 2.(b)vi). However, to provide user recipient with the
chance to receive all entities of X , other users are only eligible to
4
Protocol 2 Extension for transfer confirmations on the source blockchain
Goal: For two blockchains src, dest ∈ B and two users sender, recipient ∈ U , transfer X ⊆ A from src to dest and change ownership of X from
sender to recipient. Confirm finalization of transfer on src.
1. Burn. Similar to Protocol 1, user sender creates a new burn transaction txburn B ⟨recipient, dest,X ,Y ⟩. Contrary to Protocol 1, txburn
contains an additional variable Y ⊆ A representing the stake that will act as reward for users submitting a confirmation transaction to src
once the transfer has been completed on dest.
(a) User sender signs and submits txburn to source blockchain src invoking contract csrc.
(b) When being invoked, contract csrc performs the following steps.
(i) Perform all verification steps from Step 1.b of Protocol 1.
(ii) Verify Y ⊆ Asrcsender to make sure that user sender owns the asset entities she wants to use as stake on blockchain src.
(iii) Verify Y ∩ X = ∅, i.e., X and Y are disjoint, to ensure that the asset entities intended to be transferred are not used as stake and
vice versa.
(iv) When all checks are successful, the asset entities to be transferred are burned and the stake is locked, i.e.,
Asrcsender = A
src
sender \ (X ∪ Y ).
2. Claim. To claim the entities of asset A on destination blockchain dest, the same steps as for txclaim in Protocol 1 are performed.
3. Confirm. Once txclaim has been successfully executed on blockchain dest, any user u ∈ U can now construct a confirm transaction
txconfirm B ⟨txclaim, prooftxclaim ⟩. Variable prooftxclaim contains data which can be used to prove the successful execution and inclusion of
txclaim within blockchain dest.
(a) User u signs and submits txconfirm to the source blockchain src invoking contract csrc.
(b) When being invoked, contract csrc performs the following steps.
(i) Verify txclaim < Tclaim where Tclaim is the set of claim transactions that have already been used for confirming transfer
finalization on src . This ensures that claim transactions cannot be used multiple times.
(ii) Verify calledContract(txburn) = csrc to ensure that txconfirm invokes the same contract that has been invoked by txburn.
(iii) Run verifyInclusion(txclaim, prooftxclaim , dest) to verify that txclaim has been included in blockchain dest and is confirmed by
enough blocks. The details of transaction inclusion verifications are explained in Section 3.3.
(iv) Verify calledContract(txclaim) = cdest to make sure that the contract that has been invoked by txclaim is the contract managing
asset A on dest as intended by txburn.
(v) Verify that isSuccessful(txclaim) returns true to ensure that the execution of cdest has been completed without any error.
(vi) If all checks are successful, it is ensured that X has already been burned on src and claimed on dest. Hence, the
cross-blockchain asset transfer can be seen as confirmed.
(vii) Check if timeout for submitting txconfirm is reached. If so, user sender has not submitted txconfirm in time. Hence, the user
u = submitter(txconfirm) that submitted txconfirm receives the locked stake from txburn as reward for providing the
confirmation of the corresponding claim, i.e., Asrcu = Asrcu ∪ Y . If not, user sender gets back control of the locked stake, i.e.,
Asrcsender = A
src
sender ∪ Y , regardless of which user submitted txconfirm.
(viii) Add txclaim to the set of already used claim transactions, i.e., Tclaim = Tclaim ∪ {txclaim}.
receive the fee if they submit txclaim after a certain time period t
has elapsed.
Time period t is defined by the number of blocks that succeed
the block containing txburn on source blockchain src. Hence, when
being invoked by txclaim, cdest additionally queries the smart con-
tract implementing the transaction inclusion verifications whether
the block containing txburn is confirmed by at least t succeeding
blocks. If this is the case, the time period t is considered elapsed,
the user that submitted txclaim receives the transfer fee Xfee, and
user recipient receives the rest X \ Xfee. If not, user recipient al-
ways receives the entire set X (i.e., Xfee = ∅), even if another user
submitted txclaim (Step 2.(b)vii).
Finally, to ensure that txburn cannot be used to claim X on b
again, txburn is added to the set of already used burn transactions
Tburn (Step 2.(b)viii).
3.2.2 Protocol Extension for Transfer Confirmations.
Protocol 1 provides finality by incentivizing users to submit txclaim
for each txburn. However, only the destination blockchain dest
can be entirely certain that a cross-blockchain asset transfer was
completed successfully. Source blockchain src never actually learns
about the finalization of the transfer. To circumvent this, we can
augment Protocol 1 by adding a third kind of transaction (confirm)
which can be used to confirm the successful cross-blockchain asset
transfer back to src as displayed in Figure 2.
The extension of the protocol is specified in Protocol 2. At first,
transaction txburn is submitted to the source blockchain src. The
payload of txburn has remained largely the same except one ad-
ditional field Y . Y is a subset of asset A and represents a certain
amount of stake that will act as reward for users submitting a
confirm transaction to src.
When user sender submits txburn to src (Step 1.a), csrc first per-
forms the same verifications as in Protocol 1 (Step 1.(b)i). Addition-
ally, a couple of checks concerning the stake Y are performed. First,
it is verified that user sender is the owner of Y on blockchain src
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(Step 1.(b)ii). Second, it is verified that the sets X and Y are dis-
joint (Step 1.(b)iii). That is, the asset entities intended to be trans-
ferred should not be used as stake and vice versa. If all verifications
are successful, X is burned on src and Y is locked (Step 1.(b)iv).
Once txburn is included in src, any user can create and submit
transaction txclaim containing txburn and a corresponding proof
data prooftxburn to the destination blockchain dest . The steps per-
formed when the corresponding smart contract cdest is invoked are
identical to those in Protocol 1.
With txclaim being successfully executed and included in block-
chain dest, the successful transfer now needs to be reported back
to source blockchain src. For that, any user can submit a confirm
transaction txconfirm to src (Step 3.a).
When being invoked by txconfirm, contract csrc performs the
following steps. First, it is verified that txclaim has not already been
used for confirming transfer finalization (Step 3.(b)i). Second, it is
verified that contract csrc is the contract that has actually burned X,
i.e., whether csrc has been invoked by txburn (Step 3.(b)ii). This check
ensures that contract csrc is the intended receiver of the confirma-
tion. Third, it is verified that txclaim is included in dest by means of
transaction inclusion verification (Step 3.(b)iii). Fourth, csrc verifies
that the contract invoked by txclaim is the correct contract manag-
ing assetA on the intended destination blockchain dest (Step 3.(b)iv).
dest can be extracted from txburn which is included in the payload
of the provided txclaim. Fifth, contract csrc checks that txclaim was
successful, i.e., the execution of contract cdest has been completed
without any error (Step 3.(b)v).
If all checks are successful, contract csrc can be certain that not
only txburn has been successfully executed but that the correspond-
ing txclaim finalized the transfer on blockchain dest (Step 3.(b)vi).
To reward user u for submitting txconfirm to src, the locked stake Y
from txburn is assigned to u (Step 3.(b)vii). This provides an in-
centive for users to submit txconfirm to src for finalized cross-
blockchain asset transfers.
To provide the initiator of the transfer (i.e., user sender) the
opportunity to withdraw her locked stake, a similar approach as
for the transfer fee of txclaim is deployed. That is, a certain timeout
determines who gets assigned the locked stake Y when txconfirm is
submitted. Before the timeout, only sender is eligible for the stake.
After the timeout, anyone submitting txconfirm subsequently earns
Y as reward. As contract csrc executes both the burning of entities
and confirmations, it can track the time difference between the two
events. In our proof-of-concept implementation (see Section 4), the
block number of the block containing txburn is used as start time.
When processing the confirmation, contract csrc then calculates
the absolute difference between the current block number (i.e., the
block number of the block that will contain txconfirm) and the start
time. If the distance is greater than a certain threshold, the timeout
is considered elapsed.
The protocols above treat transaction inclusion verifications as
a blackbox. How these verifications can be realized in practice is
outlined in the next section. The evaluation of the protocols can be
found in Section 4.
Relay
Contract
Source Blockchain Destination Blockchain
Relayer
Figure 3: Blockchain relay
3.3 Cross-Blockchain Communication
The protocols described in Section 3.2 both rely on the involved
blockchains being able to verify the inclusion and confirmation
of transactions on the respective other blockchains. For instance,
blockchain dest must be able to verify whether some transaction
tx is included and confirmed in blockchain src and vice versa. For
successful transaction inclusion verifications, state information of
one blockchain needs to be communicated to the other blockchain.
Ideally, this cross-blockchain communication is decentralized in the
sense that no centralized party needs to be trusted for the validity
of the information. In this section, we look in detail at existing
solutions for cross-blockchain communication and describe how
these solutions can be leveraged to enable transaction inclusion
verifications in a decentralized manner.
3.3.1 Blockchain Relays.
Blockchain relays are one cross-blockchain communication tech-
nique for realizing transaction inclusion verifications [7]. Block-
chain relays operate by having a set of off-chain clients continuously
relaying block headers from a source blockchain to a destination
blockchain, resulting in the source blockchain essentially being
replicated within the destination blockchain. Each relayed block
header is validated on the destination blockchain according to the
validation rules of the source blockchain. As block headers do not
contain any transaction, only a small fraction of the space needed
to store full blocks is consumed on the destination blockchain.
With the block headers of the source blockchain replicated, state
information about the source blockchain can be queried fromwithin
the destination blockchain, e.g., what is the current longest branch
of the source blockchain, or is a certain block header confirmed by
at least x succeeding block headers. Further, transactions within a
block are stored in a special data structure called Merkle tree [27].
Since the root hash of the Merkle tree is also stored in the block
header, it becomes possible on the destination blockchain to verify
whether some transaction is included within a particular block of
the source blockchain. For that, users construct a so-called Merkle
proof of membership [27]. The proof is submitted to the destination
blockchain on which the proof is used to recalculate the root hash of
the corresponding Merkle tree. If the calculated root hash matches
the root hash of the stored block header, the destination blockchain
can be certain that the transaction is in fact included within the
corresponding block of the source blockchain. This technique is
also known as Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) [26].
3.3.2 Oracles.
Another way to realize cross-blockchain communication is offered
by oracles or more generally data on-chaining solutions [16]. While
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different kinds of oracles exist, one approach that can be leveraged
for transaction inclusion verifications are voting-based oracles.
In a voting-based oracle, the smart contract on the destination
blockchain that wants to verify the inclusion of some transaction
tx in the source blockchain src would start a vote by posting the
question “Is tx included in blockchain src and confirmed by enough
succeeding blocks?” to a special oracle contract on the destination
blockchain. The oracle contract starts a voting period during which
other users can post their answer (yes or no). When the voting
period ends, the answer with the most votes wins and is provided
back to the contract that started the vote. The users that voted for
the winning answer gain a reward. This provides an incentive to
a) submit a vote, and b) submit a vote to the answer that is likely
voted for by the majority in order to have a chance of winning the
reward.
Several implementations of voting-based oracles exist [1, 11, 20,
28]. While voting-based oracles are promising for on-chaining data
especially in scenarios where the truthfulness of data cannot be
objectively verified on-chain, challenges of voting-based oracles
include Sybil or lazy voting attacks [16].
Blockchain relays, on the other hand, provide an on-chain an-
swer to the question whether a certain transaction is included in
the source blockchain. This way, blockchain relays operate in a
completely decentralized manner. As long as at least one honest
client submits the correct block headers of the source blockchain,
the relay cannot be corrupted by malicious clients submitting illegal
block headers [13]. Voting-based oracles rely on the majority of
clients acting honestly. Hence, in the following section, we evalu-
ate the proposed cross-blockchain asset transfer protocols using
a prototypical implementation that leverages blockchain relays as
mechanism for transaction inclusion verifications.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed cross-blockchain asset
transfer protocols with regard to the defined requirements and con-
duct a quantitative analysis evaluating transfer cost and duration.
For the analysis, we provide a full-fledged proof-of-concept im-
plementation of our protocols for EVM-based blockchains such as
Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. The prototype as well as the evalu-
ation scripts used for obtaining the results presented in Section 4.3
are available as open-source project on GitHub2.
4.1 Prototype
As mentioned above, the prototype used for the quantitative anal-
ysis is implemented for EVM-based blockchains. The advantages
of targeting EVM-based blockchains first are twofold. First, EVM-
based blockchains such as Ethereum are today among the most pop-
ular blockchains with regard to decentralized applications (DApps)
and digital assets [8, 10]. Cross-blockchain transfer capabilities for
EVM-based blockchains can thus enhance the utility of a majority
of available assets. The second reason is rather practical. As quite
a few EVM-based blockchains exist3, multiple blockchains can be
targeted with only a single implementation. However, note that the
proposed protocols do not pose any restrictions on the concrete
2https://github.com/pf92/x-chain-protocols
3https://crypt0.zone/dag-file-size/CLO/2926154
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Figure 4: UML class diagram of the smart contract imple-
menting cross-blockchain asset transfers
means of cross-blockchain communication. As long as a blockchain
provides sufficient scripting capabilities to implement the concepts
of the protocol as well as some kind of cross-blockchain communi-
cation (e.g., oracles or relays), the solution can be easily adopted
beyond EVM-based blockchains.
Figure 4 shows the UML class diagram of the smart contract
implementing cross-blockchain asset transfers (i.e., contract ci in
our protocol). An ERC20 token is used as asset. To provide standard
ERC20 functionality like ownership, the contract inherits from an
ERC20 implementation offered by OpenZeppelin4. For transaction
inclusion verifications, the prototype leverages the Testimonium
blockchain relay for EVM-based blockchains5. The relay can be ac-
cessed by an external relay smart contract that provides an interface
for transaction inclusion verifications.
A transaction in Ethereum consists of the fields nonce, gasPrice,
gasLimit, to, value, data, and a signature (v, r, s) [36]. Field data
contains the payload (e.g., the parameters for a smart contract
invocation) of the transaction. Field to contains the address of the
smart contract that was invoked by the transaction (i.e., function
calledContract(tx) in our protocol). The submitter submitter(tx) of
the transaction can be calculated out of the signature fields v, r,
and s.
Notably, the transaction data does not contain information about
the execution status of the transaction, i.e., whether the execu-
tion succeeded or failed. In Ethereum, this information is stored
in another data structure, the so-called transaction receipt. For
each transaction there exists a corresponding receipt that contains
among other fields any events that were emitted during the exe-
cution of the transaction and a status flag indicating the success-
ful execution of the transaction. Thus, when evaluating function
isSuccessful(tx) in our protocols, the smart contract must have ac-
cess to the receipt of tx as well.
In Ethereum, transactions and receipts are kept in separate
Merkle trees which do not contain references to each other. The
only thing that links transaction and receipt logically within a block
is that their position in their respective trees is identical. Both, the
inclusion of the transaction and the receipt, can be verified via
Merkle proofs of memberships using their respective Merkle trees.
Thus, to make sure that receipt and transaction belong together,
both Merkle proofs need to be evaluated along the same search path.
4https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/2.x/erc20
5https://github.com/pantos-io/testimonium
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Hence, in our prototype, the proof data certifying the inclusion of
a transaction (e.g., prooftxburn ) not only contains a Merkle proof for
the transaction itself but also for the receipt of the transaction, and
the search path along which the Merkle proofs need to be evaluated.
4.2 Requirements Analysis
This section evaluates the protocols with regard to the requirements
defined in Section 3.1.
Requirement 1: Ownership.
The requirement states that a user sender must own subsetX of asset
A on source blockchain src before she can transfer it. When user
sender submits a burn transaction txburn invoking contract csrc,
the contract verifies that X ⊆ Asrcsender (see Step 1.(b)ii of Protocol 1)
making sure that user sender is the owner of X on src. Hence, we
consider Requirement 1 as fulfilled.
Requirement 2: No Claim Without Burn.
Requirement 2 states that claiming X on blockchain dest should
only take place if X has been burned on source blockchain src.
To claim X on dest, a user u submits a claim transaction txclaim.
As defined by Protocol 1, the user provides txburn as well as some
proof data in the payload of txclaim. Before recreating X , the asset
contract cdest on blockchain dest performs several checks.
First, it is verified that txburn is included in the source block-
chain src and confirmed by enough blocks (see Step 2.(b)iii of Pro-
tocol 1). Second, the protocol checks that txburn indeed invoked
asset contract csrc on the source blockchain src (see Step 2.(b)iv
of Protocol 1). Third, contract cdest verifies that the execution of
txburn was successful (see Step 2.(b)v of Protocol 1).
These three checks ensure that assets are only created on the des-
tination blockchain dest if and only if they have been successfully
burned by the contract csrc on source blockchain src.
Of course, user u can try to counterfeit txburn. For instance,
she can set up her own asset contract c ′src on blockchain src that
mimics the behaviour of the actual asset contract csrc and sub-
mit a burn transaction tx′burn invoking c ′src. She then submits a
claim transaction containing tx′burn as well as prooftx′burn to block-
chain dest, invoking the asset contract cdest. Just from the transac-
tion payload, cdest has no way of knowing that tx′burn is invalid.
The transaction inclusion verification will also be valid. However,
Protocol 1 checks which smart contract has been invoked by tx′burn
on the source blockchain src (Step 2.(b)iv of Protocol 1). Since
calledContract(tx′burn) = c ′src , csrc, the claim is rejected even
though tx′burn seems a valid and successfully executed burn trans-
action.
User u can also try to create fake proof data faketxburn for a seem-
ingly valid transaction txburn that has not yet been included in
blockchain src though. In this case, verifyInclusion(txburn,
faketxburn , src) returns false and the claim request is rejected (Step
2.(b)iv of Protocol 1).
Obviously, the fulfillment of this requirement strongly depends
on the security of the used transaction inclusion verification mech-
anism. A security analysis of the mechanism used in our proof of
concept implementation can be found in [13].
Requirement 3: Double Spend Prevention.
To prevent users from claiming burned assets multiple times by
reusing the same burn transaction txburn, two conditions need to
be fulfilled. First, it should not be possible to claim assets on the
destination blockchain dest multiple times using the same burn
transaction txburn. Second, it should not be possible to use txburn
for claiming assets on any blockchain other than dest.
To ensure the first condition, all burn transactions that have
already been used within claim transactions are stored in a set
Tburn within asset contract cdest. When cdest is invoked by a new
claim transaction txclaim, it only executes the claim if the provided
burn transaction txburn is not yet included inTburn (see Step 2.(b)ii
of Protocol 1).
The second condition is fulfilled by encoding an identifier of
the desired destination blockchain dest within burn transactions.
When an asset contract cb on some blockchain b is invoked by a
claim transaction containing txburn, cb can verify whether it is the
intended destination contract by comparing b = dest (Step 2.(b)i of
Protocol 1). If not, the claim is rejected.
Since these two conditions are ensured by the protocol, Require-
ment 3 can be considered fulfilled as well.
Requirement 4: Decentralized Finality.
Decentralized finality requires that each transfer with a success-
fully executed burn transaction txburn on source blockchain src is
eventually finalized by a corresponding claim transaction txclaim
submitted to destination blockchain dest, and that this finalization
process is not dependent on a single actor.
For the analysis of finality, we make use of the BAR (Byzan-
tine, Altruistic, Rational) model [2] which has found application
in security analysis for blockchain protocols and extensions be-
fore (e.g., [13, 18, 19]). Under this model, byzantine users may de-
part arbitrarily from the protocol for any reason, e.g., they may be
faulty or malicious; altruistic users always adhere to the protocol
rules regardless of whether deviations would lead to a higher profit;
and rational users are always aiming at maximizing profit according
to some utility function meaning that these users will deviate from
the protocol if they expect doing so to yield a higher profit than
following the protocol rules.
Finality depends on the continuous participation of off-chain
users since at least two transactions have to be submitted to two
different blockchains to complete the protocol. Since users that
submit transactions incur costs, participation should be motivated
by an appropriate incentive structure.
The protocol in this paper offers a reward to users submitting
the claim transaction. As the reward is at least as high as the
submission cost of claim transactions (see Section 4.3), rational
users have an economic incentive to finalize transfers. However, in
any protocol, rational users according to the BAR model cannot be
fully trusted to act rationally in the sense of the protocol’s incentive
structure since seemingly irrational behavior might be perfectly
rational in the context of a larger ecosystem with the protocol being
part of it [12]. For instance, rational users might aim at yielding
profit in the larger ecosystem by finding ways to bet against the
protocol or the value of the asset.
Therefore, rational users are not guaranteed to comply to the pro-
tocol rules even with perfectly aligned incentives. In fact, building
an open and permissionless system that withstands all participants
potentially deviating from the protocol rules appears fundamentally
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impossible [12]. Thus, in our protocol, not only the users directly
involved in a transfer are allowed to post the claim transaction,
but rather any user of the system can do it. This provides stronger
finalization guarantees as finalization does not depend on a single
user acting honestly. Rather, it is sufficient if one user out of all
users is altruistic to ensure finalization.
Requirement 5: Transfer Confirmation (optional).
With Requirements 1 to 4 fulfilled, cross-blockchain asset transfers
with decentralized finality can be realized. However, in Protocol 1
only the destination blockchain dest knows when a transfer is
finalized. Source blockchain src has no way of knowing about the
finalization. We have thus proposed Protocol 2 as extension of
Protocol 1 to fulfill the additional requirement of providing src with
a finalization confirmation. The confirmation takes place in the
form of an additional transaction txconfirm being submitted to src.
In a way, txconfirm also has to comply with Requirements 2
to 4. That is, txconfirm should only be successful if there exists a
corresponding claim transaction txclaim successfully executed on
dest (Requirement 2); it should not be possible to confirm txclaim
multiple times (Requirement 3); after a claim transaction txclaim is
successfully executed on dest, the corresponding confirm transac-
tion txconfirm is eventually submitted to src (Requirement 4).
The requirements are fulfilled by Protocol 2 using the same
strategy that is applied for claim transactions. That is, similar to
how a claim transaction’s payload contains a burn transaction and
corresponding proof data, txconfirm consists of a claim transaction
txclaim and corresponding proof data prooftxclaim .
To fulfill Requirement 2, asset contract csrc performs the follow-
ing checks when being invoked by a confirm transaction txconfirm.
First, csrc verifies that txclaim is included in blockchain dest and
confirmed by enough blocks (see Step 3.(b)iii of Protocol 2). Second,
the contract verifies that the provided claim transaction txclaim
has indeed invoked asset contract cdest on blockchain dest (see
Step 3.(b)iv of Protocol 2). Third, csrc checks that txclaim has been
successfully executed on blockchain dest (see Step 3.(b)v of Pro-
tocol 2). With these checks in place, Requirement 2 holds also for
confirm transactions.
To fulfill Requirement 3, it should not be possible to use the same
claim transaction txclaim multiple times on blockchain src as well
as it should not be possible to use txclaim on any blockchain other
than src for confirming transfer finalization. The first condition is
ensured by adding each claim transaction txclaim that has been suc-
cessfully confirmed to a set Tclaim (see Step 3.(b)viii of Protocol 2).
Whenever csrc is invoked, it is checked whether txclaim provided
within txconfirm is included inTclaim (see Step 3.(b)i of Protocol 2). If
so, the request is rejected. To ensure the second condition, the asset
contract that has been invoked by the burn transaction contained
within txclaim is compared to csrc (see Step 3.(b)ii of Protocol 2). If
they match, csrc is the intended receiver of the finalization confir-
mation.
To ensure that each transfer finalization is eventually confirmed
on src (Requirement 4), an incentive structure similar to that used
for transfer finalization is employed. Essentially, whenever some
user sender submits a burn transaction txburn to blockchain src, she
has to provide some stake Y . If user sender does not post txconfirm
before a timeout, any user can redeem Y by submitting txconfirm
to src. Hence, there is an economic incentive for users to confirm
transfer finalizations on src. Applying the same chain of reasoning
used above for analyzing eventual finality reveals that as long as at
least one altruistic user is participating, each transfer finalization
on blockchain dest is eventually confirmed on blockchain src.
As the additional confirm transaction txconfirm complies to
Requirements 2 to 4, we consider the requirement for transfer
confirmations to be fulfilled by Protocol 2.
4.3 Quantitative Analysis
With the functional requirements fulfilled, this section analyzes
transfer cost and duration using the developed proof-of-concept im-
plementation. For that, we conduct cross-blockchain asset transfers
between the public Ethereum test networks Rinkeby and Ropsten.
Rinkeby and Ropsten are identical with respect to Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) and inter-block time (about 15 seconds). The main
difference is the consensus algorithm used. Rinkeby uses Proof of
Authority (PoA) and Ropsten uses Proof of Work (PoW). However,
the execution of smart contracts is independent of the consensus
algorithm. Therefore, evaluating transfers in one direction provides
a sufficient estimation of transfer cost and duration. Our evaluation
consists of conducting 500 transfers of 1 ERC20 token from Rinkeby
to Ropsten, i.e., burn and confirm transactions are submitted to
Rinkeby whereas claim transactions are posted on Ropsten. For
simplicity reasons, as the protocol extension (Protocol 2) also in-
cludes the steps of Protocol 1, we only use the implementation of
the protocol extension (see Protocol2.sol6) for our experiment. The
corresponding smart contract has been deployed on both Rinkeby7
and Ropsten8.
4.3.1 Transfer Cost.
For every performed transfer, we measure the gas consumption
of all three transaction types. The obtained results are outlined in
Figure 6. Note that the figure contains the gas consumption for
the protocol as well as the gas consumption of the Testimonium
blockchain relay used for verifying the inclusion of transactions.
The total gas consumption of Protocol 1 is about 343.5 kGas
(standard deviation 25.81 kGas), calculated as the sum of txburn
and txclaim. The total gas consumption of Protocol 2 is about 744.4
kGas (standard deviation 46.01 kGas). Protocol 2 additionally in-
cludes the gas consumption of txconfirm leading to the higher total.
With an exemplary exchange rate of about 130.10 EUR per ETH and
a gas pice of 1.5 GWei, this results in transfer costs of about 0.07,
and 0.15 EUR for Protocol 1 and Protocol 2, respectively. Notably,
transaction inclusion verification mechanisms may require a fee
possibly increasing overall cost. For simplicity, in our experiments,
we set the fee that has to be paid to the Testimonium blockchain
relay for each inclusion verification to zero.
The execution of txburn is the cheapest followed by txclaim fol-
lowed by txconfirm. The differences can be explained by the different
payloads of each transaction type. As the payload of txburn does
not consist of any other transaction and proof data, less data needs
to be passed to and processed by the asset contract leading to a
lower gas consumption. On the contrary, txclaim contains txburn as
6https://github.com/pf92/x-chain-protocols/blob/master/contracts/Protocol2.sol
7https://rinkeby.etherscan.io/address/0x17e225fb242f5359915583b760808aae4b1c5623
8https://ropsten.etherscan.io/address/0xa2a7d22993259c842c0af0a47779046a5818712b
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well as proof data for txburn and txconfirm contains txclaim together
with the corresponding proof data leading to the overall higher gas
consumptions.
The gas consumption of transaction inclusion verifications de-
pends on the concrete means of cross-blockchain communication,
i.e., in our case the Testimonium relay. The relay requires Merkle
proofs of membership to be passed as proof data. As such, the gas
consumption of the relay not only consists of the execution cost but
also of the cost of the data required for the execution. In our case,
the gas consumption of the relay is higher than the gas consump-
tion of the protocol alone. Other inclusion verification mechanisms
may exhibit different gas consumptions.
4.3.2 Transfer Duration.
In this subsection, we analyze the average duration of asset trans-
fers. As described in Section 3, after submitting a burn transaction,
the submitter may wait some time before posting subsequent trans-
actions such as the corresponding claim transaction. Hence, the
overall transfer duration depends to a large extent on the user
initiating the transfer. However, despite this uncertainty, we can
measure the smallest possible transfer duration by submitting each
transaction at the earliest possible time, i.e., as soon as the pre-
ceding transaction is included in the blockchain and confirmed
by enough blocks. In our experiment, we require each transaction
on Rinkeby as well as on Ropsten to be confirmed by at least 5
succeeding blocks. Both blockchains have an inter-block time of
approximately 15 seconds.
In our experiment, assets are sent from Rinkeby to Ropsten.
Therefore, burn and confirm transactions are submitted to Rinkeby
while claim transactions are submitted to Ropsten. Hence, du-
rations for burn and confirm transactions were measured on
Rinkeby whereas for claim transactions on Ropsten.
Essentially, claim (confirm) transactions can be submitted to
Ropsten (Rinkeby) as soon as the corresponding burn (claim) trans-
actions are included and confirmed on Rinkeby (Ropsten). However,
users need to wait until the relay running on Ropsten (Rinkeby) has
been brought up to date before they can submit the corresponding
claim (confirm) transactions. Otherwise, the transactions would
not be successful as the relay does not have enough information to
verify the inclusion of transactions yet.
To this end, ∆Inclusion denotes the duration from the moment a
transaction is submitted to Rinkeby (Ropsten) until it is included in
some block, ∆Confirmation specifies the time it takes for an already
included transaction to be confirmed by enough succeeding blocks,
and ∆Relay denotes the time it takes for the relay to collect enough
information to be able to verify the inclusion of transactions.
Figure 5 shows the average duration for each transaction type as
well as for both protocols. With an average duration of 91 seconds
(standard deviation of 9 seconds), burn transactions clearly achieve
the smallest duration, followed by confirm (average duration of
114 seconds, standard deviation of 22 seconds) followed by claim
transaction (average duration of 191 seconds, standard deviation
of 103 seconds). The durations of claim and confirm transactions
again strongly depend on the used transaction inclusion verification
mechanism. In case other mechanisms such as voting-based oracles
are used, the durations of these transaction types may change.
The total duration of Protocol 1 is calculated by summing up the
durations of burn and claim transactions, while the total duration
of Protocol 2 also contains the duration of confirm transactions.
This yields an average transfer duration of 282 seconds (standard
deviation of 103 seconds) for Protocol 1 and an average duration
of 395 seconds (standard deviation of 106 seconds) for Protocol 2.
Transfers with Protocol 2 clearly take longer as an additional trans-
action is required.
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5 RELATEDWORK
Several solutions for cross-blockchain asset transfers have been
proposed in the literature [3, 5, 14, 15, 22, 35, 39]. Evaluating the
existing solutions against the requirements defined in Section 3.1
reveals that solutions generally fulfill Requirements 1 to 3, however
they lack with regards to decentralized finality (Requirement 4) and
transfer confirmations (Requirement 5) or do not provide imple-
mentations of the proposed protocols. A summary of the different
cross-blockchain asset transfer solutions is provided in Table 1.
In XClaim [39], cross-blockchain asset transfers are realized by
first locking assets with a client called “vault” on a “backing” block-
chain and reissuing the assets on another “issuing” blockchain.
Locking of the assets on the backing blockchain is verified on the is-
suing blockchain via blockchain relays. However, the locked assets
remain with the vault on the backing blockchain. While malicious
vaults (e.g., vaults that do not unlock the asset again) are penalized,
transfer finality still depends on this single actor. In contrast, our
protocols enable any client—whether directly involved in the trans-
fer or not—to finalize transfers. Further, transfer confirmations are
not foreseen by the XClaim protocol.
Metronome [3] provides cross-blockchain asset transfers for
their own MET token. Token holders can export MET from one
blockchain and then import them on another blockchain via re-
ceipts where validators vote on the validity of receipts. While this
can prevent illegal transfers, at the time of writing, Metronome
cannot be considered decentralized since only authorized nodes
can participate as validators. Further, Metronome does not provide
concepts for transfer finality and confirmations.
The authors of [22] and [15] provide constructions for cross-
blockchain asset transfers between PoW and Proof of Stake (PoS)
blockchains, respectively. While [22] provides transaction inclu-
sion verifications via Non-interactive Proofs of Proof of Work
(NiPoPoWs) [21], [15] enables transaction inclusion verifications
via a novel cryptographic construction called ad-hoc threshold
multisignatures (ATMS). As such, NiPoPoW and ATMS are used to
prove events (e.g., burn transactions) that occurred on the source
blockchain to the destination blockchain. While this satisfies Re-
quirement 2, Requirements 3 to 5 are generally not covered by the
protocols. Further, NiPoPoWs currently cannot be implemented
in existing PoW blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum without in-
troducing a so-called velvet fork. While such forks do not change
the consensus rules of the blockchain, they nonetheless require
adoption from at least a subset of miners.
Similarly, Zendoo [14] provides a protocol for cross-blockchain
asset transfers focussing on zero-knowledge proofs as method for
transaction inclusion verification. However, requirements such as
transfer finality and confirmations are not discussed. Further, the
protocol relies on a special sidechain construction and can thus not
be easily implemented on existing blockchains.
An approach that takes transfer finality and confirmations into
account is presented by van Glabbeck et al. [35]. The paper proposes
a generic protocol for payments across blockchains similar to how
multi-hop payment channels operate [24]. The work has a strong
focus on finality and confirmation, requirements such as double
spend prevention are mentioned though not further specified. Also,
the protocol has not been implemented. It is difficult to tell whether
Table 1: Cross-blockchain asset transfer protocols
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XCLAIM [39] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Metronome [3] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Gazi et al. [15] ✓ ✓
Kiayias and Zindros [22] ✓ ✓
Zendoo [14] ✓ ✓ ✓
van Glabbeek et al. [35] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
DeXTT [5] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Protocol 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Protocol 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
the protocol allows cross-blockchain asset transfers as defined in
Section 3.1 or only value transfers similar to atomic swaps.
An alternative approach for cross-blockchain asset transfers is in-
troduced in DeXTT [5]. DeXTT describes an asset that can exist on
different blockchains at the same time. However, users cannot keep
different denominations of the asset on each blockchain. Rather,
user balances are synchronized across all participating blockchains.
While the synchronization process itself is decentralized in the
sense that anyone can participate, the protocol uses a concept
called claim-first transactions where assets are claimed on the other
blockchains before being burned on the blockchain on which the
transfer was initiated. This clearly violates Requirement 2. Transfer
confirmations (Requirement 5) are also not foreseen.
Other works [17, 18, 33] focus on the transfer of value across dif-
ferent blockchains, however these solutions rather focus on atomic
swaps where two different assets are exchanged and do not consti-
tute true cross-blockchain asset transfers as defined by our require-
ments in Section 3.1.
Finally, projects such as Polkadot [37] and Cosmos [23] aim for
more generic cross-blockchain interactions. While cross-blockchain
asset transfers are mentioned as potential use cases, the documen-
tation does not mention specifics on how these transfers will be
realized. Further, these projects aim to provide interoperability
primarily between specialized blockchains that adhere to certain
structures and consensus protocols. While there are plans to inte-
grate existing blockchains such as Bitcoin or Ethereum into the
systems, the documentation again does not provide specifics.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to provide
requirements, a specification, and a proof-of-concept implementa-
tion of a cross-blockchain asset transfer protocol that also takes
transfer finality and transfer confirmations into account.
6 CONCLUSION
Decentralized cross-blockchain asset transfers are one way to pro-
vide interoperability between blockchains. In particular, they pre-
vent vendor lock-in by allowing blockchain assets to be moved
away from the blockchains on which they were originally issued
in a completely decentralized way. While many different solutions
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for enabling cross-blockchain asset transfers have been proposed,
these solutions often focus on specific cross-blockchain commu-
nication mechanisms and neglect fundamental functionality that
cross-blockchain asset transfers should offer. Therefore, in this
work, we defined general requirements and specifications for cross-
blockchain asset transfer protocols. Providing a proof-of-concept
implementation of the proposed protocols, we have shown that re-
quirements such as decentralized finality and transfer confirmations
can be fulfilled without having to rely on a centralized entity. By
detaching the protocol from the specific means of cross-blockchain
communication, the protocol can be used and adopted for a wide
range of blockchains. In future work, we will investigate how the
concepts of this work can be extended to provide interoperabil-
ity beyond asset transfers, for instance generic message passing
between blockchains.
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